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Abstract
People overestimate the probability that others share their values or preferences. I
introduce type projection equilibrium (TPE) to capture such projection in Bayesian
games. TPE allows each player to believe his opponents share his type with inter-
mediate probability ρ. After establishing existence, I address my main question:
How does projection affect behavior in games? I analyze auctions and distribu-
tion games. In auctions, projection implies an increased sense of competition,
which induces overbidding in all (first-price) auctions. In addition, it biases the
perceived value distribution, which induces cursed bidding in common value auc-
tions. Thus, projection induces a hitherto neglected bias in bidding. It is novel
in that it explains behavior across conditions and it is independently founded in
psychology. I test projection equilibrium in multiple ways on existing data and
find that it substantially improves on alternative concepts, both in isolation and in
addition to them. The findings are cross-validated by testing projection of social
preferences in distribution games.
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1 Introduction
The false consensus bias is the tendency to assume that one’s own opinions, prefer-
ences and values are typical and shared by others. Following its original observation
of Ross et al. (1977), this form of “projection” has been confirmed in a variety of
experiments, as Mullen et al. (1985) show in a meta-analysis. Projection may per-
sist even if subjects are provided with factually contradicting information (Krueger
and Clement, 1994). Thus, projection is of intuitive relevance in all choices under
incomplete information—not just in the non-strategic environments on which the psy-
chological literature traditionally focuses, but also in strategic interactions. Current
concepts studying projection in “games” focus on one-sided incomplete information.
In their seminal paper, Loewenstein et al. (2003) study projection of utility onto future
selves, finding that it explains anomalies in purchases of durable goods. In a different
context, Madarász (2012) studies projection of information from an informed player to
an uninformed one, which explains the hindsight bias in agency problems.
The purpose of the present paper is to study projection of generic “types” in games
with two-sided incomplete information. Types may capture social preferences or object
valuations. I set up a simple model of projection of types in Bayesian games where
players may overestimate the probability that their opponents share their type—ranging
from the special cases of zero projection (the original Bayesian case) to full projection
(disregarding all prior information).1 The degree of projection is denoted by ρ ∈ [0,1).
In equilibrium, players know their opponents’ strategies but compute their expected
payoffs with a projection bias. For each ρ, a corresponding type projection equilibrium
is shown to exist. In the analysis, I estimate the degree of projection ρ to be around 0.5
in simple distribution games and auctions, and find that allowing for projection better
describes and predicts behavior in these games. Aside from explaining behavior, the
relevance of projection also has policy implications, as the projection bias is reduced
when subjects are educated explicitly (Engelmann and Strobel, 2012).
My main application is the analysis of auctions with players who project their values.
Object values are personal traits, and thus intuitively projected in general, and their pro-
jection has been observed explicitly in bargaining (Bottom and Paese, 1999; Galinsky
1The case of full projection is regularly considered in analyses of social preferences. The present pa-
per provides a conceptual framework allowing the analyst to capture the more intricate case of imperfect
projection. This is critical for several reasons. First, full projection is rarely observed in psychology.
Second, I will estimate imperfect degrees of projection in auctions (where full projection does not fit),
and third, imperfect projection also explains behavior under social preferences, as shown below.
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and Mussweiler, 2001) and consumption decisions (Frederick, 2012; Kurt and Inman,
2013). The basic intuition for projection in auctions is simple. When bidding on say a
house, projecting bidders neglect competitors whose values are vastly inferior, against
whom they surely win, and competitors whose values are vastly superior, against whom
they surely lose. Rather, they focus on competitors with similar values, trying to en-
sure winning against them. This focus on close competitors is a form of the projection
bias—implicitly, the bidders overestimate the probability that competitors have values
similar to their own. It increases the sense of competition, which induces overbidding
in first-price auctions and explains the loser regret observed by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay
(2007). In addition, the biased perception of the value distribution obscures the infer-
ence of the object value in common value auctions, which “curses” one’s estimates and
yields the Winner’s Curse.
The increased sense of competition also relates to risk aversion in private value auc-
tions, but the projection bias is special in that it induces a similar sense of competition
in common value auctions, on top of the cursed value perception. Thus, the projection
bias provides a unified explanation of overbidding in both information conditions. This
is interesting, as differences between information conditions may be rather intranspar-
ent to both bidders and analysts. For example, the differences are small between affil-
iated private values and common values. If one believes that the behavioral source of
overbidding does not change between these fairly similar regimes, then the unified ex-
planation by the independently observed projection bias is promising. From this point
of view, the research question may be refined as follows: Knowing that people project
their values, which aspects of behavior does projection explain in auctions, and which
aspects are to be explained differently, by say risk aversion or cursedness (Eyster and
Rabin, 2005)? The short answer is that projection equilibria seem to fit behavior fairly
well and alternative models do not seem to add significantly to its explanatory content.
I test projection equilibria in many ways, by evaluating the testable predictions de-
rived in the theoretical analysis and by a structural analysis evaluating its quantitative
fit to individual choices. I allow for a variety of behavioral assumptions including
non-equilibrium beliefs and subject heterogeneity, and test the adequacy of projection
to describe, predict, and infer from behavior. The main findings are that projection
fits about similarly well as risk aversion in private values auctions, about as well as
cursed equilibrium in common value auctions, but overall it describes and predicts be-
havior better than these concepts (also in combination). That is, a specific degree of
projection, estimated to be around ρ≈ 0.5, captures behavior consistently across con-
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ditions. In itself it explains around 65% of observed variance. Additionally accounting
for risk aversion does not improve the descriptive or predictive adequacy significantly,
but accounting for subject heterogeneity improves the model adequacy by around 10
percentage points.
I complement the findings by examining imperfect projection (ρ= 0.5) of social prefer-
ences. Relatedly, projection of guilt aversion was observed by Bellemare et al. (2011),
and projection of inequity aversion was observed by Blanco et al. (2014). In addition,
I show that projection allows to predict within-subject changes of behavior, using the
data of Blanco et al. (2011). In their experiment, each subject played six games, the in-
dividual degrees of envy and guilt were calibrated using two of these games and used to
predict behavior in the remaining four games (assuming either equilibrium or rational
expectations). Blanco et al. (2011) found that these predictions did not correlate with
the actual choices. Blanco et al. (2014) show that in simple sequential-move games,
projection of both strategies and preferences can be observed. Using type projection
equilibrium,2 I show that predictions using intermediate values of ρ do correlate with
behavior and thus help explain the apparent behavioral changes.
I conclude that the projection bias matters in games with incomplete information,
which extends existing evidence from psychology. At least in the games analyzed
here, behavior is better described and predicted by considering projection. Since un-
derstanding behavior in distribution games and auctions is of independent interest, as
large stocks of literature have been devoted to analyses of behavior in these games, the
result that the projection bias organizes much of the variance still remaining in these
games is a positive finding. In turn, as the projection bias may be reduced by explicit
information of subjects, the finding that projection helps explaining observed behavior
leads to potential policy implications that are discussed in the conclusion.
Section 2 defines type projection equilibrium and relates it to existing literature. Sec-
tion 3 derives theoretical predictions for auctions. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 examines the testable implications of projection equilibrium using these data and
Section 6 analyzes the adequacy to capture individual behavior. Section 7 concludes.
There is comprehensive supplementary material with further analyses.
2Note that Blanco et al. (2011) consider either simultaneous-move games or games with strictly se-
quential moves where each player moves once. Projection equilibrium can be applied straightforwardly.
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2 Type projection equilibrium
2.1 Definition
Type projection equilibrium extends Bayesian Nash equilibrium by incorporating the
projection bias in a stylized manner. To simplify notation, I focus on games where
all players are ex-ante symmetric in the sense that their type spaces are identical, but
generalizations are possible. My formulation does not require “types” to represent
preference parameters, but the idea of projection equilibrium may appear particularly
natural if the reader wishes to keep this interpretation in mind.
Let Γ =
〈
N,(Ai)i∈N ,T0,(Ti)i∈N , p,(ui)i∈N
〉
denote a Bayesian game, including the set
of players N, and sets of actions Ai and types Ti for each player i ∈ N. The set of
Nature’s types is T0, the set of type profiles is T = T0×T1×·· ·×Tn, and the probability
distribution over T is denoted by p. Types may be correlated. The marginal distribution
on Ti is denoted by pi, and action profiles are denoted by a ∈ A = A1×·· ·×An.
Definition 1. A Bayesian game Γ is called finite if N,A,T are finite. It is called type-
symmetric if Ti = Tj and pi = p j for all i, j ∈ N.
Given action profile a ∈ A and type profile t ∈ T , i’s utility is ui(a, t). The strategy
σi(·|ti) ∈ ∆Ai of i maps i’s actions to probabilities contingent on type ti. As usual,
A−i =× j∈N\{i}A j and T−i =× j∈N∪{0}\{i}Tj, but slightly abusing notation, define
σ−i(a−i|t−i) =∏ j 6=iσ j(a j|t j) as the product of the probabilities. The expected utility
of type ti ∈ Ti from action ai in response to σ−i may thus be written as
pii
(
ai|ti,σ−i
)
= ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
p(t−i|ti) ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
σ−i(a−i|t−i).
A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) if all types
ti ∈ Ti of all players i ∈ N put positive weight only on optimal actions,
σi(·|ti) ∈ arg max
σ′i∈∆Ai
∑
ai∈Ai
σ′i(ai) pii
(
ai|ti,σ−i
)
.
Type projection equilibrium extends BNE by allowing players to overestimate the
probability that their opponents are of the same type as they are. This biases their
beliefs about types. Formally, player i ∈ N assigns weight 1− ρ, ρ ∈ [0,1), to their
prior information that the types adhere to the prior p and weight ρ to their projection
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that all players’ types are equal to i’s type. The parameter ρ is called degree of projec-
tion. Due to the projection bias, players believe that their opponents’ strategy profile
is summarized as
σ˜−i(a−i|t−i, ti) = (1−ρ)∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|t j)+ρ∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|ti) (1)
rather than σ−i(a−i|t−i). A detailed discussion in relation to existing concepts and
psychological evidence follows shortly, but briefly, let me discuss two assumptions
inherent in this formulation. On the one hand, players project their types onto all
their opponents simultaneously. Alternatively, one might assume that players project
their type independently onto their opponents. The resulting predictions appear to
be qualitatively rather similar. Besides its analytical tractability, I assume correlated
projection, as it corresponds with the observations of Camerer et al. (2004) and Costa-
Gomes et al. (2009) that experimental subjects tend to believe their opponents make
correlated choices. On the other hand, players project their exact type. In Bayesian
games with ordered type sets, an intuitive alternative might be that players project by
putting extra weight on the belief that the opponents are of similar types, i.e. of types
that are proximate to theirs under the assumed ordering. I choose the simpler model of
exact projection, as it equally applies to environments with both ordered and unordered
type sets (an example of the latter will be the projection of social preferences), and as
it avoids measures of the degree of similarity between types.
The type projection equilibrium is defined as the BNE in response to σ˜−i. That is, as in
every equilibrium concept, players anticipate their opponents’ strategies σ−i, but due
to their projection bias, they use σ˜−i when computing expected payoffs.
Definition 2. For any ρ ∈ [0,1), a strategy profile σ= (σ1, . . . ,σn) is a ρ-type projec-
tion equilibrium (ρ-TPE) if for all players i ∈ N and all types ti ∈ Ti,
σi(·|ti) ∈ arg max
σ′i∈∆Ai
∑
ai∈Ai
σ′i(ai) pii
(
ai|ti, σ˜−i
)
.
Existence can be established as any ρ-TPE of Γ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of an
augmented game Γ˜ where the projected events are possible draws by Nature. This re-
lates to the argument establishing existence of cursed equilibrium in Eyster and Rabin
(2005).
Proposition 1. If Γ is a finite and type-symmetric Bayesian game and ρ ∈ [0,1), a
ρ-type projection equilibrium of Γ exists.
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Proof. See appendix.
2.2 Relation to the theoretical literature
Type projection incorporates a projection bias similar to the one defined by Loewen-
stein et al. (2003). They consider a decision maker predicting his own utility in future
states of the world. Given consumption c and current state s′, the decision maker
predicts the utility will be (1−α)u(c,s)+αu(c,s′), α ∈ [0,1] in alternative state s.
In many games of interest, types and utilities are related and then a type-projecting
player predicting utilities of her opponents would predict very similarly to the utility-
projecting players defined by Loewenstein et al. (2003). Frequently, the relationship
between types and utilities is even linear, and in such cases a type-projecting player
would predict the same utilities as a utility-projecting one. The difference materi-
alizes in Bayesian games. Since players understand that they respond to a mixture
of types, each of which plays a distinct strategy, a type-projecting player anticipates
mixed strategies of each opponent’s type—with probability 1− ρ the Bayesian type
plays and with probability ρ the projected type plays. In turn, utility projection as
in Loewenstein et al. (2003) implies that players believe their opponents’ types have
“average” utilities and play pure strategies each.3
Type projection also relates to information projection (Madarász, 2012, 2013). An in-
formation projecting player believes that his opponents know all he knows, in addition
to their existing knowledge. In an auction, for example, information projection implies
that the opponents know my values, in addition to knowing their own values. Type
projection assumes instead that the opponents share i’s type. Arguably, information
projection appears to be less appealing in the context of say auctions, while it appears
appealing in cases of one-sided incomplete information, and it provides an intriguing
explanation of the hindsight bias.
Another concept related to type projection is cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin,
2005). Similarly to TPE, cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for Bayesian games
introducing a subjective type distribution differing from the objective one. The differ-
ence is that a type projecting player projects his own type onto his opponents, while
3Also note the difference to pure strategy projection: A type projecting player projects what he would
play in his opponents’ shoes, assuming all are of his type but they keep their individual incentives. In
contrast, both utility projection and strategy projection implicitly assume the opponents neglect their
original incentives and adopt my utilities or use my strategies.
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a cursed player projects a random type. Both models distort the correlation between
opponents’ actual types and their strategies, which distorts the information that can be
inferred from their actions. Thus, both concepts predict distorted inference in common
value auctions, implying a Winner’s Curse. Type projection affects behavior beyond
information inference, however, e.g. by inducing loser regret in first-price auctions.
Aside from behavioral implications, type projection seems to more closely implement
the projection bias as observed in the psychological literature, that people project their
own traits or opinions. Such evidence usually draws from interactions with ex-ante
symmetric type sets. In turn, cursed equilibrium appears more appropriate to cap-
ture beliefs if type sets are asymmetric, as result of which projection of the own type
appears less intuitive. Market interactions with one-sided incomplete information as
analyzed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) appear to be a prototypical example of a Bayesian
game that is more intuitively captured by cursed equilibrium than by type projection
equilibrium.
A concept inverting the idea of cursed equilibrium is the level-k model as applied
to auctions by Crawford and Iriberri (2007). Contrary to cursed equilibrium, where
strategies are correct but projected types are random, level-k assumes types are correct
but strategies are random. The predictions are rather similar. Players at level 1 assume
their opponents randomize uniformly, which again weakens the amount of information
contained in the opponents’ bids and thus induces cursed bidding in standard common
value auctions. Since level 1 is contained as a special case in many models of asym-
metric beliefs about strategies, e.g. in cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004), noisy
introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004), and asymmetric logit equilibrium (Weizsäcker,
2003), the results of Crawford and Iriberri suggest that belief asymmetry as such may
well affect behavior in Bayesian games. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the comparative relevance of these concepts with respect to explaining behavior in
Bayesian games with ex-ante symmetric type sets. In these games, I hypothesize type
projection to be of relevance.
Question 1. To which degree is behavior in type-symmetric Bayesian games explained
by type projection, cursedness, belief asymmetry, and risk aversion?
A distinctive feature of level-k models is their assumption of discrete subject types.
Thus, as a test for the level-k model, and to be able to adequately model subject het-
erogeneity, I will also address the following, more specific question.
Question 2. In auctions, is subject heterogeneity discrete?
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2.3 Empirical evidence on false consensus and projection
False consensus and projection bias are used largely synonymously to describe the
tendency to assume that the own opinions, preferences and values are shared by oth-
ers. Ross et al. (1977) present evidence on projection with respect to both, choices in
everyday decision making and individual characteristics (such as personal problems,
expectations, and preferences). They show that subjects’ beliefs about others’ choices
correlate with their own choices, and their beliefs about the others’ characteristics cor-
relate with their own. An early meta-analysis illustrating the robustness of projection
is provided by Mullen et al. (1985), showing that its magnitude is largely invariant with
respect to the generality of the reference population. However, projection is strongest
in relation to people similar to oneself (Clement and Krueger, 2002). Projection ap-
pears to have evolved, as it is helpful in predicting characteristics of other subjects.
Hoch (1987) shows that the majority of subjects would actually improve their pre-
dictive accuracy if they weighted their own positions even stronger, as they seem to
face difficulties in using available information about the targets. Krueger and Clement
(1994) show that the projection bias persists even if subjects are provided with factually
contradicting information, which is called the truly false consensus effect. Engelmann
and Strobel (2000, 2012) qualify this result, showing that the extent of truly false con-
sensus depends on the kind and clarity of information provided to the subjects.
There is ample evidence of projection both within individuals and between individ-
uals. On the one hand, individuals tend to project their current preferences on their
future selves. For example, Gilbert et al. (1998) show that subjects overestimate the
duration of affective reactions to negative events, Read and Van Leeuwen (1998) show
that individuals project their current state of appetite when ordering meals in advance,
and analyzing catalog orders, Conlin et al. (2007) show that individuals underestimate
how tastes change over time.4 In their seminal theoretical study of utility projection,
Loewenstein et al. (2003) show that it also explains phenomena such as overspending
early in life and misguided purchases of durable goods.
On the other hand, projection is similarly strong between individuals, even in anony-
mous interactions such as games played in laboratory experiments. In such environ-
ments, subjects appear to project their own choices and preferences. That is, subjects
tend to consider their preferences and choices to be more common than they actually
4Further, Simonsohn (2010) shows that preference projection affects college enrollment decisions,
via the cloud cover observed on visiting day, Grable et al. (2004), Grable et al. (2006), and Kliger and
Levy (2008) show that projection in reaction to stock market price changes explain investment decisions.
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are.5 Relatedly, Blanco et al. (2011) analyzed the within-subject stability of inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, FS) using experimental data with six observations
per subject from different games. They estimate individual FS preferences based on
two of the six decisions per subject and use these estimates to predict the subject’s
remaining four decisions (assuming rational expectations about preferences or choices
of other subjects). These predictions did not significantly correlate with the actual
choices. In one of the games, however, Blanco et al. observed that projection poten-
tially affects behavior. Namely, in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma, subjects’ choices
as first mover can be predicted based on their own choices as second mover. In order to
verify its robustness, Blanco et al. (2014) test the predictiveness of own second-mover
choices for own first-mover choices in a larger variety of sequential social dilemmas.
Their new results indicate evidence of both, strategy projection and preference pro-
jection. In order to verify the relevance of projection with respect to their first paper
(Blanco et al., 2011), I re-analyzed their data allowing for either strategy projection
or preference projection. The results, provided as supplementary material, indicate
that both forms of projection indeed allow to successfully predict individual behavior
across games, confirming projection also in these cases.
Preference projection as observed in the literature can be directly captured by type pro-
jection equilibrium in Bayesian games. Laboratory games are played under anonymity
and preferences are private information. In a Bayesian game, one’s type may charac-
terize one’s preferences, and preference projection is therefore a particular instance of
type projection in games where (social) preferences are behaviorally relevant. Regard-
ing type projection in the case of auctions, the underlying assumption is that subjects
project their object valuation, exaggerating the probability that other subjects value
the object similarly. There also exists explicit evidence of precisely this form of pro-
jection. Frederick (2012) and Kurt and Inman (2013) show that estimates of others’
willingness to pay are highly correlated with the respondents’ own willingness.6 This
evidence implies the hypothesis that projection also affects bidding in auctions. To my
knowledge, there is but one paper linking projection and bidding, namely Engelmann
and Strobel (2012), who mention the idea in their discussion. In addition, Güth and
Ivanova-Stenzel (2003) experimentally analyze auctions and observe that behavior is
5For example, Messé and Sivacek (1979) observe strategy projection in the one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Offerman et al. (1996) observe it in public goods games. Iedema and Poppe (1995) and
e.g. Aksoy and Weesie (2012) show that subjects project their social value orientation, and Bellemare
et al. (2011) find preference projection with respect to guilt aversion.
6In addition, they show that the estimates are biased upward, which however is less commonly
reported. Similarly, Bottom and Paese (1999) and Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) show that subjects
tend to use their own reservation price when they estimate others’ reservation prices in negotiations.
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largely invariant with respect to the subjects’ knowledge of the distributions of val-
ues. In their experiment, subjects do not seem to use information on the distribution of
values effectively, which also indicates the existence of a projection bias.
3 Type projection in auctions
3.1 Projection bias and incentives in bidding
Initially, I focus on auctions with either affiliated private values (APV) or common
values (CV). The case of independent private values (IPV) is qualitatively similar to
APV in many ways, but the notation of mixed strategies needs to be modified, obfus-
cating a joint discussion. The notation is standard. A player gets a signal denoted by
x. The expectation of the object value conditional on the signal x is denoted by v(x),
its expectation conditional on both the own signal x and the highest opponent signal
y is denoted by v(x,y). Note that the notation does not yet entail a restriction of the
information condition toward either APV or CV. The density of the highest opponent
signal y conditional on my signal x is fY (y|x). A pure strategy b? is a continuous,
monotonic function mapping signals x to bids b ∈ R. The expected payoff of bidding
b ∈R, conditional on my signal x and in response to opponents bidding function b?, is
Π(b|b?,x) = E
[
(Vi−b) Ib?(Y )<b)|Xi = x
]
=
∫ b−1? (b)
x
(
v(x,y)−b) fY (y|x)dy.
The symmetric BNE solves b = b?(x). In contrast, assume the player in question
projects his type x onto his opponents, as defined above, with degree ρ. Now, the
expected payoff of b conditional on signal x depends on the relation of b and b?(x).
Define one’s share of the prize as s = 0 if b < b?(x), s = 1/n if b = b?(x), and s = 1 if
b > b?(x). The expected payoff is a weighted sum of objective and projected payoff,
Πρ(b|b?,x) = (1−ρ)
∫ b−1? (b)
x
(
v(x,y)−b) fY (y|x)dy+s ·ρ ∫ x
x
(
v(x,y)−b) fY (y|x)dy,
where the second summand captures the case of projection. Note that in the case
of projection, the payoff does not depend on the opponents’ signal or their strategies
beyond their implications with respect to s. The implications of projection can be
dissected into two components, loser regret and cursed value perception, as follows.
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Loser regret Let w(b|x,b?) denote the probability of winning without projection,
and wρ(b|x,b?) denote the respective probability with ρ-projection. Again using the
“projection share” s = 0 if b < b?(x), s = 1/n if b = b?(x), and s = 1 if b > b?(x),
w(b|x,b?) =
∫ b−1? (b)
x
fY (y|x)dy,
wρ(b|x,b?) = (1−ρ)
∫ b−1? (b)
x
fY (y|x)dy+ s ·ρ
∫ x
x
fY (y|x)dy.
If the projecting player bids less than opponents with the same signal, b < b?(x), he
underestimates the probability of winning, as wρ(b) = (1−ρ)w(b)+ρ ·0 is then less
than the objective probability w(b). In turn, if he outbids opponents with the same
signal, he overestimates the probability of winning, as wρ(b) > w(b) results then. In
the latter case, the projecting player ensures that he wins against opponents with the
same signal, the probability of which he exaggerates. This induces an incentive to
outbid opponents with the same signal, under all information conditions. These in-
centives resemble loser regret (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007), i.e. to feel regret if a
higher bid would have won the auction profitably. Projecting players act as if they felt
“conditional loser regret”, i.e. regret if a higher bid would have won the auction against
opponents with the same valuation. The technical differences appear minor, as loser
regret materializes only if the opponents’ values are similar to mine. Thus, I will say
that projection induces loser regret as observed by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007).7
Cursed value perception Let v˜(x|b,b?) denote the object value conditional on win-
ning without projection, and let v˜ρ(x|b,b?) denote the respective value with ρ-projection.
v˜(x|b,b?) =
∫ b−1? (b)
x v(x,y) fY (y|x)dy∫ b−1? (b)
x fY (y|x)dy
v˜ρ(x|b,b?) =
(1−ρ) ∫ b−1? (b)x v(x,y) fY (y|x)dy+ s ·ρ ∫ xx v(x,y) fY (y|x)dy
(1−ρ) ∫ b−1? (b)x fY (y|x)dy+ s ·ρ ∫ xx fY (y|x)dy
If one outbids opponents with the same signal, i.e. if b > b?(x), the expected object
value under projection is a weighted average of conditional and unconditional value. In
7Note that the projected probability of winning is discontinuous in b if the opponents play a pure
strategy. It jumps at b= b?(x) where one “overtakes” opponents with the same signal. The discontinuity
will disappear once we allow for mixed strategies, but the incentive to slightly outbid opponents with
similar values is robust to allowing for mixed strategies.
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this case, the projected expectation is equal to the expectation under cursedness (Eyster
and Rabin, 2005). Alternatively, if b < b?(x), the projected expectation equates with
the actual expectation. That is, the projected expectation is biased only if one outbids
opponents with the same value. In standard common value auctions, the bias is an
upward bias, i.e. the object value is overestimated. Thus, the projected expectation
exhibits an upward jump at b = b?(x), but once we allow for mixed strategies, the
transition will be smooth again. Besides inducing cursed object valuations, this incre-
ment of the expectation adds to the loser regret discussed above. Thus, the incentives
of projecting players to outbid opponents with the same signal are particularly strong
in common value auctions. On a qualitative basis, type projection therefore predicts
that if we hold the degree of projection constant, overbidding occurs in both informa-
tion conditions, but the normalized degree of overbidding (suitably defined) is larger
in common value auctions than in private value auctions.
Question 3. Is the degree of overbidding larger in common value auctions than in
private value auctions?
Such a comparative prediction is not implied by existing concepts such as cursedness,
level-k, or risk aversion. In the canonical models of common value auctions and private
value auctions, cursedness and level-k predict overbidding only for common values,
while risk aversion predicts overbidding only for private values. Thus, type projection
is unique in that it makes comparative predictions across information conditions, but
the testability critically depends on whether we find a suitable measure of the degree
of overbidding. A few such measures are proposed and tested below.
3.2 Mixed bidding strategies
Consider an auction with private values, a player with signal x, and assume his op-
ponents bid according to the pure strategy b?. Outbidding the opponents by some
b = b?(x)+ ε increases the probability of winning but decreases the expected payoff
conditional on winning. Without projection, there exists an Bayesian Nash equilibrium
bid b?(x) where these effects are balanced.
With projection, outbidding the opponents by b = b?(x)+ε yields a marginal decrease
of the conditional payoffs but a discrete upwards jump of the winning probability—
reflecting the insurance of winning against opponents with the same signal. Thus,
whenever the conditional payoff after bid increment is positive, v˜ρ(x|b,b?)− b > 0,
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the projecting player prefers outbidding the opponents to matching their bids. In turn,
a symmetric, pure strategy profile can be an equilibrium only if it induces zero ex-
pected payoffs. Then, however, even projecting players can realize positive profits by
deviating to bids b < b?(x). They would lose against players with similar valuations
(probability ρ< 1), but they win profitably against some players with lower valuations.
Thus, they make positive profits with positive probability (if ρ < 1), and in turn, pure
symmetric equilibria do not exist. As a result, type projection equilibria of auctions
with near-continuous bids must be mixed. This raises the following question.
Question 4. Do individual bidding strategies exhibit strategic randomization?
This question is addressed below. Next, let us examine mixed bidding strategies and
mixed equilibria. To this end, let us focus on two-player auctions. This simplifies no-
tation substantially, as there is a curse of dimensionality in analyses of mixed strategy
equilibria.8 I further restrict the environment as follows.
Assumption 1. Consider a two player auction with the signals x and y of the players.
The distribution of d = x− y is independent of x, has density fD and support [d,d].
The key assumption here is independence of x, which is invoked by many empirical
analyses. In canonical auctions with affiliated or common values, such as those imple-
mented by Kagel and Levin (1986) and Kagel et al. (1987), independence is satisfied
almost exactly unless one’s signal x is rather near the bounds of the signal space. The
assumption of independence is thus valid in the interior of the signal space and allows
us to focus on the properties of strategic bidding abstract of distortions induced by the
signal space bounds. Note that independence is not satisfied in the case of independent
private values, which prevents a joint analysis assuming independence.
The assumption of independence between d = y− x and x allows us to express the
strategic problem of the bidders independently of the signal x. Given signal x, the
own bid is normalized toward r = b− x and the opponent’s bid is normalized toward
r?= b?(y)−y. Normalized bids express the “degree of bid shading”, i.e. the amount by
which the players undercut their signals x and y, respectively. Theoretically, these nor-
malizations are valid in standard auctions, as the normalized BNE bids are independent
8In contrast to pure strategies, where it is sufficient to focus on the opponent with the highest signal,
with mixed strategies, even players with lower signals may place the winning bid. Derivations of equi-
libria for more than two players must account for this, which appears technically straightforward but
tedious, without offering any obvious additional insights in relation to the case of two players.
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of the signals.9 Empirically, their validity has not yet been analyzed.
Question 5. Are normalized bids r = b−x in APV and CV auctions independent of x?
Given independence, define the normalized expected object value as v˜(d) := v(x,x+
d)− x, with d = y− x as above. The normalized expected payoff without projection is
Π˜(r |r?) =
∫ r−r?
d
(
v˜(d)− r) fD(d)dd.
Thus, with Assumption 1, a two-player auction is fully characterized by the duple
〈v˜, fD〉. In equilibrium, the normalized bid r is negative and the expected normalized
payoffs are positive. More generally, by normalization of all terms in relation to x,
we reduce the dimensionality of the strategy space, which helps both analytically and
econometrically. In particular, we can express mixed strategies conveniently. Let R⊂
R denote the set of normalized strategies r. A mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆R is the density of
a distribution on R. The expected (normalized) payoff of bidding r in response to the
mixed strategy σ is therefore
Π˜(r |σ) =
∫
R
σ(r?)Π˜(r|r?)dr? =
∫
R
σ(r?)
∫ r−r?
d
(
v˜(d)− r) fD(d)dd dr?.
3.3 Type projection equilibria in auctions
Under full projection, players assume that their opponent’s signal equates with theirs
and that they do not learn anything new when winning the auction. Hence, the ob-
ject value conditional on winning equates with the unconditional object value, V˜ =∫ d
d v˜(d) fD(d)dd, and the probability of winning in response to σ equates with σ’s cu-
mulative density Fσ(r) =
∫
r?<rσ(r?)dr?. Again it is independent of the opponent’s
actual signal. Under ρ-projection, with 0 < ρ < 1, both conditional value and proba-
bility of winning are weighted averages of full-projection and zero-projection. Under
ρ-projection, the expected payoff is
Π˜ρ(r|σ) =
∫
R
σ(r?)Π˜ρ(r|r?)dr? = (1−ρ)Π˜(r|σ)+ρ(V˜ − r)Fσ(r)
To characterize the respective (mixed) equilibria, let us first consider their support. The
support of a strategy σ is denoted by Sσ = {r ∈ R|σ(r) > 0} with bounds r = infSσ
9Details follow, but for example, in the CV auction of Kagel and Levin (1986), the BNE bids are
b = x−w, where w is exogenous (w is the “bandwidth” of the distribution). Hence the normalized BNE
bids r =−w are indeed independent of x.
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Figure 1: Projection predicts skewed overbidding in both APV and CV auctions. Risk
aversion and cursedness predict symmetric overbidding in APV and CV, respectively
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(c) CV: Projection ρ
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and r = supSσ. Taking the derivative of the payoff with respect r (in response to σ),
we obtain (in the interior of the support)
Π˜′ρ(r|σ)
∣∣
r∈(r,r) = ρ(V˜ − r)σ(r)−ρFσ(r)+(1−ρ)Π˜′(r|σ).
Now, along the support of the mixed equilibrium, Π˜′ρ(r|σ) = 0 is satisfied. At the lower
bound r = r, this implies Π˜′(r|σ) = 0 and σ(r) = 0. For interior r ∈ (r,r), we obtain
σ(r) =
Fσ(r)
V˜ − r −
1−ρ
ρ
· Π˜
′(r|σ)
V˜ − r ,
which implies that σ(r) is increasing in r, since Fσ(r) is increasing and Π˜′(r|σ) is
decreasing. The upper bound of the support follows from Π˜′ρ(r|σ)
∣∣
dr<0 = 0, which
yields σ(r) = −1/(v− r)+ 1−ρρ Π˜′(r|σ)/(v− r). At the upper bound, the density σ
drops to zero, and overall the equilibrium strategy is thus left-skewed (i.e. the mean is
left to the median). The following proposition establishes skewness and characterizes
the bounds for a variety of conditions including standard APV and CV auctions.
Definition 3. An auction 〈v˜, fD〉 exhibits strategic complementarity if dΠ˜(r|r?)/dr is
increasing in r?.
Proposition 2. Consider a first-price auction 〈v˜, fD〉 that exhibits strategic comple-
mentarity and non-decreasing v˜. For any ρ ∈ (0,1), any symmetric ρ-TPE is mixed, its
support satisfies rBNE < r < r < V˜ , and its density is monotonically increasing.
The upper bound r of the support equates with rBNE in case ρ = 0 and it converges
to V˜ in case ρ = 1. Figure 1 plots the predictions of type projection in APV and CV
auctions, alongside those of risk aversion in APV auctions and cursedness in CV auc-
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tions.10 The predictions are plotted for logit equilibria as analyzed in the econometric
analysis below, which illustrates that the predicted bounds and shape of the equilibrium
strategies are robust to (small) logit errors. Both risk aversion and cursedness predict
symmetric distributions, while type projection predicts left-skewed strategies.
Question 6. Are strategies left-skewed?
The bounds of the support may alternatively accommodate for risk aversion. For exam-
ple, consider constant relative risk aversion, u(pi) = piα/α, α 6= 0, and let rα denote the
respective BNE. Risk aversion shifts the lower bound of the support of the correspond-
ing ρ-TPE from rBNE to rα, i.e. under risk aversion the ρ-TPE has support [rα,rmax]
where rmax < V˜ can be characterized similarly to above.
Finally, let us briefly look at second-price auctions. Due to the second-price payment
rule, the loser-regret component of projection vanishes, but the cursed value perception
continues to affect behavior. The projected expectation exhibits a jump discontinuity
at b = b?(x), where one overtakes the opponent, if the object has a common value.
In such cases, players again perceive to benefit from overtaking opponents, i.e. their
conditional value is not uniquely defined but depends on b R b?(x). This rules out
optimality of bidding one’s value and the existence of pure equilibria. Otherwise, e.g.
in private value auctions, projection equilibria are pure and players bid their values.11
4 The data
I re-analyze a total of eight experiments to cover a variety of auction formats and
information conditions. Type projection yields distinct behavioral predictions, and
thus is testable, across these conditions, while we might expect the projection bias to
be of varying relevance if we look at a sufficiently large set of auction formats. Thus,
the following analysis constitutes a rather challenging but informative test of projection
in auctions. The data sets used in the analysis are chosen with two further objectives
in mind. On the one hand, all main information conditions should be included, i.e.
independent private values, affiliated private values, and common values. I intend to
cover these conditions in standard auction formats (e.g. continuous bids and signals)
and in non-standard auction formats (e.g. a non-standard common value, as explained
10Risk aversion does not affect equilibrium predictions in common value auctions and cursedness
does not affect predictions in private value auctions. Hence, the corresponding plots are skipped.
11A more comprehensive analysis can be found in the supplementary material.
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Table 1: Data sources
Inexperienced Experienced
Format Source Values Signals #Subj #Obs #Subj #Obs
Standard auctions
First price, Kagel and Levin (2002) v = X0 Xi|X0 ∼U [s± ε] 51 255
common value Kagel and Levin (1986) v = X0 Xi|X0 ∼U [s± ε] 49 237
Second price, Garvin and Kagel (1994) v = X0 Xi|X0 ∼U [s± ε] 28 140
common value
First price,
affiliated private
Kagel et al. (1987) v = Xi Xi|X0 ∼U [x0± ε] 42 210 42 210
First price, Dyer et al. (1989) v = Xi Xi ∼U [0,30] 18 180 18 180
Independ. private Kagel and Levin (1993) v = Xi Xi ∼U [0,28.3] 10 50 10 100
Non-standard auctions
First price,
Independ. private
Goeree et al. (2002b) v = Xi Xi discrete 80 400 80 400
Second price,
Common value
Avery and Kagel (1997) v = X1+X2 Xi ∼U [1,4] 23 115 23 115
Note: The discrete signals in Goeree et al. (2002b) are uniform draws from either {0,2,4,6,8,11} or
{0,3,5,7,9,12}. The data for inexperienced subjects are mostly from Crawford and Iriberri (2007). In
most rounds of Dyer et al. (1989) and Kagel and Levin (1993), the subjects played two auction markets
simultaneously. Focusing on the first and last five rounds they played, we mostly have ten observations
per subject. Due to bankruptcies in CV auctions, there are not always five observations per subject.
shortly, and discrete bids and signals), of which the latter will be used for strict out-
of-sample analysis. On the other hand, I intend to cover exactly those data sets that
had been used in previous analyses to test the adequacy of behavioral theories. Indeed,
the eight data sets considered here form the union of the data sets used by Goeree
et al. (2002b), Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), Eyster and Rabin (2005), and Crawford and
Iriberri (2007), to test quantal response equilibrium, risk aversion, cursed equilibrium,
and level-k, respectively. Thus, if data selection has any influence on the results, then
it would be in favor of existing theories, and my estimates will indicate a lower bound
of the relevance of type projection. In addition, the repetitive use of these data sets in
the literature indicates the existence of a consensus on the adequacy of the underlying
experimental designs and on their feasibility to test behavioral theories.
An overview of the data sets used in the analysis is provided in Table 1. The four
auction experiments implementing conditions that I call “standard” are the top entries
in this table. The data on first price, common value auctions are from the experiment
of Kagel and Levin (1986) and Kagel and Levin (2002, Chapter 4). The common
value is v = X0 where individual signals are distributed as Xi|X0 ∼ U [x0±w]. The
BNE strategy is b(xi) ≈ xi−w.12 The data on second price, common value auctions
12The exact BNE strategy is b(xi) = xi−w+Y with Y = 2wN+1 ×exp
{−N(xi−x−w)/2w}, but Y ≈ 0
18
are from Kagel and Levin (1986) and Garvin and Kagel (1994). Signals and value are
distributed as in the first-price case, but now the BNE strategy is b(xi) = xi−w+ 2wN .
The data on first price auctions with affiliated private values are from Kagel et al.
(1987). The private value v = Xi is distributed as Xi|X0 ∼U [x0±w] with BNE strategy
b(xi) ≈ xi− 2wN . Finally, the first price auctions with independent private values are
from Dyer et al. (1989) and Kagel and Levin (1993), where the private value v = Xi
is distributed as Xi ∼U [0,30] and Xi ∼U [0,28.3], respectively. The BNE strategy is
b(xi) = xi (n−1)/n using n to denote the number of players.
The two auction experiments implementing conditions that I call “non-standard” are
the bottom two entries in Table 1. Goeree et al. (2002b, GHP02) implement a first price
auction with independent private values where bids and signals are small integers. As
discussed above, type projection predicts overbidding in IPV auctions primarily due
to the low costs of outbidding opponents. In the experiment of GHP02, the smallest
bid increment is 1 and thus comparably large. Avery and Kagel (1997) implement a
second-price auction with non-standard common value. There are two players who
draw independent signals Xi ∼U [1,4] and the common value is v = X1 +X2 (in their
“symmetric case”, on which I focus).13 This auction is non-standard for its violation
of Assumption 1, i.e. the distribution of the difference between the signals is not in-
dependent of the own signal, and for the experimental observation that subjects do not
uniformly overbid. Rather, subjects with high values underbid. For these reasons, I
consider these two experiments to be suitable out-of-sample tests of projection.
As indicated in Table 1, I distinguish behavior of experienced subjects and inexpe-
rienced subjects. This follows a tendency in the existing literature, and in particular
Crawford and Iriberri (2007), who suggest that non-equilibrium concepts such as level-
k are most suitable to capture the “initial” behavior of inexperienced subjects, while
equilibrium concepts with say risk aversion or cursedness are most suitable to cap-
ture the “converged” behavior of experienced subjects. The comparative analysis of
both experienced subjects and inexperienced subjects will allow me to detect paradigm
shifts in behavior as a function of experience. I closely follow Crawford and Iriberri
(2007) by calling a subject “inexperienced” during the first five auctions the subject
played, and by inversion, I call a subject “experienced” during the last five auctions
the subject played (usually out of approximately 20 auctions in a session). The lat-
ter accounts for the fact that in common value auctions, in particular, behavior has not
if the signal xi is not very close to the bounds of the signal space.
13Turocy (2008) discusses the auction in detail. Such common values arise if one might find himself
in a position to sell the object later (thus, the opponent’s value matters) or e.g. due to prestige effects.
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converged after five auctions, which precludes me from using all observations from the
sixth auction on in the analysis of experienced subjects. In turn, I show in the supple-
mentary material that behavior is independent of time during the first five auctions and
during the last five auctions, respectively, indicating that these partitions of the data set
meet the necessary conditions of the ensuing analysis.
Are normalized bids independent of x?
Concluding the data description, let me address Question 5, as it affects the analysis of
bids. In Bayesian Nash equilibrium, normalized bids are approximately independent of
the signal x if one’s signal is not close to the bounds of the signal space. This condition
applies to most observations.14 If independence is empirically valid, Assumption 1 can
be invoked and mixed strategies in APV and CV auctions simplify to the normalized
strategies defined above. In order to facilitate comparisons of treatments, let me further
normalize bids with respect to the signal width w in APV and CV auctions. That is,
unless stated otherwise, I refer to r = (b− x)/w as the normalized bid.15
I test the independence by regressing bids b on signals x, with subject-level random
effects and bootstrapping p-values to account for the panel structure of the data (and the
possible non-normality of errors, namely skewed errors). The results are provided in
Table 2 in the column “Estimate B(X)”.16 The normalized bid r = b− x is statistically
independent of x if the regression coefficient of x does not differ from 1. It does not
differ significantly in eleven of the twelve treatments distinguished for APV and CV
auctions (at α= .05). In this multiple testing problem, this is well within the limits of
chance assuming a family-wise error rate of .05.
Result 1. In APV and CV auctions, normalized bids b(x)− x are independent of x.
Table 2 additionally presents the results of corresponding tests for IPV auctions. The
BNE prediction is b = a+ r · x where a is not statistically different from zero and
r = (n− 1)/n under risk neutrality. This prediction is tested in an analyses similar to
the previous one and confirmed in the sense that a is statistically insignificant in all
14Alternatively, independence obtains if subjects simply disregard the bounds entirely.
15This second normalization with respect to w does not obstruct the validity of the independence test,
as I test independence treatment-wise, and w is constant in each treatment (or nearly constant, reflecting
the treatment distinctions of Kagel and Levin, 1986). For example, with r = −0.4, subjects bid 0.4 ·w
less than their signal, r = 0 indicates bidding one’s signal, r = −2/N is the BNE strategy in APV
auctions, and r =−1 is the BNE strategy in CV auctions.
16The technical details on the bootstrapping procedure are provided in the note to the Table 2.
20
Table 2: Summary statistics of bidding in the first-price auctions
Inexperienced subjects Experienced subjects
Degree of Standard Deviation Degree of Standard Deviation
Condition Bidding function Overbidding within Ss between Ss Skewness Bidding function Overbidding within Ss between Ss Skewness
Independent private values, First price (DKL89, KL93)
N = 3 b =−0.031
(0.234)
+0.803??
(0.018)
· x 0.104??
(0.017)
0.161
(0.031)
0.025 −3.17?? b = 0.028
(0.149)
+0.822??
(0.01)
· x 0.143??
(0.014)
0.126
(0.018)
0.054 −3.26??
N = 6 b =−0.039
(0.196)
+0.849??
(0.013)
· x −0.021
(0.02)
0.162
(0.034)
0.053 −3.35?? b = 0.037
(0.182)
+0.875??
(0.009)
· x 0.034??
(0.012)
0.108
(0.018)
0.044 −4.49??
N = 5 b = 0.195
(0.241)
+0.886??
(0.01)
· x 0.08??
(0.021)
0.145
(0.053)
0.028 −4.34?? b =−0.873
(0.496)
+0.896??
(0.017)
· x −0.021
(0.042)
0.264
(0.036)
0.129 −1.65?
Affiliated private values, First price (KHL87)
N = 6,w = 6 b = 0.986?
(0.006)
· x−0.284??
(0.079)
·w −0.127??
(0.038)
0.366
(0.085)
0.148 −3.83??
N = 6,w = 12 b = 0.992
(0.006)
· x−0.172??
(0.048)
·w 0.104??
(0.026)
0.052
(0.006)
0.15 0.1 b = 1
(0.005)
· x−0.247??
(0.037)
·w 0.088??
(0.021)
0.168
(0.044)
0.129 −1.52?
N = 6,w = 24 b = 1
(0.006)
· x−0.168??
(0.02)
·w 0.164??
(0.022)
0.09
(0.015)
0.135 −0.24
Common value auctions, First price (KL86)
N ≤ 4,w = 6 b = 0.996
(0.003)
· x−0.22
(0.139)
·w 0.657??
(0.066)
0.341
(0.033)
0.28 0.57??
N ≤ 4,w≤ 18 b = 1.014
(0.013)
· x−0.676??
(0.172)
·w 0.551??
(0.099)
0.43
(0.163)
0.095 0.54? b = 1.002
(0.016)
· x−0.905??
(0.576)
·w 0.106?
(0.038)
0.276
(0.087)
0.011 −1.77
N ≤ 4,w≥ 24 b = 1
(0.021)
· x−0.63??
(0.091)
·w 0.373??
(0.05)
0.31
(0.058)
0.178 0.7?
N = 7,w = 6 b = 0.999
(0.002)
· x−0.322??
(0.088)
·w 0.629??
(0.067)
0.333
(0.036)
0.313 0.54?
N ≥ 5,w = 12 b = 0.99
(0.007)
· x−0.575??
(0.084)
·w 0.338??
(0.051)
0.151
(0.025)
0.225 1.02?
N ≥ 5,w = 18 b = 1
(0.008)
· x−0.654??
(0.082)
·w 0.348??
(0.045)
0.296
(0.025)
0.206 1.09??
N ≥ 5,w≥ 24 b = 0.999
(0.012)
· x−0.714??
(0.085)
·w 0.279??
(0.046)
0.231
(0.025)
0.201 1.33?
Notation: b is the bid, x is the signal, w is the interval width in APV and CV auctions, N is the number of players
Normalized bids: The normalized bids are r = (b− x)/w in APV and CV auction and r = b/x in IPV auctions
Degree of overbidding is the difference between the mean normalized bid and the normalized equilibrium bid, it is estimated controlling for subject-level random effects (“between-subject
standard deviation”). The within- and between-subject standard deviations refer to the distribution of normalized bids
Skewness: Skewness of the normalized bids after controlling for subject-level random effects (i.e. skewness of the errors in the regressions of normalized bids on intercept, controlling for
random effects).
Experience: Subjects are “inexperienced” in their first five auctions and “experienced” in their last five auctions.
Asterisks indicate the bootstrapped p-values of the null hypotheses that the respective parameters are either 1 (in case of the coefficients of x in APV and CV auctions, which are predicted to
be 1) or 0 (in all other cases). “??” indicates p-values less than .005, and “?” indicates p-values between .005 and .05. The lower threshold .005 roughly implements the Bonferroni correction
for multiple testing across treatments (note that there are more than 10 treatments, so the correction is implemented in a rather conservative way).
Bootstrapped p-value All p-values are bootstrapped, resampling the data set 10.000 times at the subject level (reflecting the panel structure of the data). To define the p-value of the null
hypothesis that some statistic s is zero, let sb denote its value in sample b and let s0 denote its original value. The p-value of the two-sided test is 12R #
{
b : |sb−s|> |s0|
}
+ 12R #
{
b : |sb−s| ≥ |s0|
}
,
where s is the mean of (sb) and R the number of samples. Other p-values are defined similarly.
cases. This rules out the alternative hypothesis that subjects’ behavior is captured by
the simple heuristic b = x− a or by a blend of these approaches as in b = r · x− a.
Thus, it is feasible to normalize bids also in IPV auctions, namely towards r = b/x,
and to define corresponding mixed strategies as mixtures over normalized bids r= b/x.
Again, this normalization reduces the strategic dimensionality and enables econometric
analyses of equilibria in mixed strategies (including QRE and ρ-TPE).
Result 2. In IPV auctions, normalized bids b(x)/x are independent of x.
These results show that bids in standard auctions can be normalized such that they are
statistically independent of x, namely toward r = (b− x)/w in APV and CV auctions
and toward r = b/x in IPV auctions. Figure 2 provides histograms of the distributions
of these normalized bids across treatments. Due to the independence of x, histograms
of normalized bids contain all the information that is also available in scatter plots
of bids on signals (as frequently found in the literature), but by reducing the dimen-
sionality of the distribution, the information is provided in a more condensed way.
Essentially, these histograms are left to be explained by behavioral theories. The nor-
malization also allows us to look at the data from novel perspectives, e.g. skewness
and within-subject variances are meaningful moments of the data after normalization
of bids. Thus, we can make and test novel statements about facets of behavior that had
to be disregarded so far, as discussed next.
5 Evaluating the testable predictions of projection
Now, I address the remaining questions raised in the theoretical analysis. Those ques-
tions relate particular moments of the data to predictions of type projection. Later,
I will address the question to which degree the various behavioral theories allow to
capture the actual distributions of bids.
Is subject heterogeneity of discrete nature? The shape of subject heterogeneity
is interesting for two reasons. The possible existence of discrete components in the
population is predicted by two of the asymmetric-belief models, level-k and CHM.
Accordingly, the population consists of subjects spread across various discrete levels
of reasoning, and different levels of reasoning induce different (normalized) strategies.
Thus, if subjects’ strategies can be organized into different clusters, it would be indica-
tive of strategic reasoning according to level-k or CHM. Further, the potential necessity
22
Figure 2: First-price auctions, affiliated private values (KHL87). Inexperienced sub-
jects (a–b) vs. experienced subjects (c–d). Plots are histograms of r=(Bid−Signal)/w
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Figure 3: First-price auctions with common values (KL86), inexperienced subjects
(a–d) vs. experienced subjects(e–h). Plots are histograms of r = (Bid−Signal)/w
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(h) N = 5−7,w = 24,30
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Figure 4: First-price auctions with independent private values (DKL89). Inexperienced
subjects (a–c) and experienced subjects (d–f). Histograms of Bid/Signal
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to differentiate discrete components on top of the random effects affects the modeling
strategy below. Continuity of subject heterogeneity simplifies the analysis, as random
effects, or random coefficients, would then suffice to capture subject heterogeneity.
The histograms of normalized strategies in Figures 2, 3, and 4, and the respective ker-
nel density estimates, suggest that the distributions are uni-modal and therefore consist
of single (continuous) components in all cases. In order to verify this impression, I
estimate finite mixture models with up to three components. Each component is a
characterized by a mean normalized strategy, by a between-subject variance regarding
the subjects making up the component, and a within-subject variance to capture indi-
vidual randomization.17 The details are relegated to the supplementary material, but
the impression given by the histograms is confirmed and summarized as follows.
Result 3. Across information conditions and experience levels, secondary components
are either insignificant (16 of 18 treatments) or contain less than 10 percent of the
subjects (2 of 18 treatments, both with experienced subjects in the APV auction).
I conclude that random effects suffice to capture subject heterogeneity.
Are strategies left-skewed? Type projection equilibrium predicts distributions of
normalized bids to be left-skewed (the mean left of the median). Thus, the estimated
skewness should be negative in the data sets. Figures 2, 3, and 4 present histograms
of the normalized bids in APV, IPV, and CV auctions, respectively. First, looking at
the overall distribution, the results appear rather clear-cut.18 The distributions of bids
are significantly left-skewed in private value auctions, i.e. in both IPV and APV auc-
tions, while skewness tends to be inverted in CV auctions. In all five cases where exact
treatment-wise comparisons between inexperienced and experienced subjects are pos-
sible, the estimated skewness further shifts toward left-skewed distributions as subjects
gain experienced. Second, due to subject heterogeneity, the overall skewness may not
equate with the average individual skewness. The individual skewness is the skew-
ness of the errors when regressing the normalized bids on the intercept controlling for
17In order to focus on whether discrete levels of reasoning need to be distinguished, the within-
subject variances are held fixed constant across components. The structural model below will allow for
heterogeneity in within-subject variances. Further, the models are estimated using the EM algorithm
using 25 different starting values in each case, and the number of model components is estimated by
maximizing the integrated classification likelihood (ICL), following Biernacki et al. (2000). Maximizing
the ICL estimates the correct number of components of finite mixtures more consistently than say Bayes
Information Criterion (BIC). See McLachlan and Peel (2000) for further information.
18All of the histograms additionally present information on the skewness of the distributions of nor-
malized bids. An asterisk is printed next to the skewness estimate if it deviates significantly from zero.
As above, I evaluate the significance of the skewness by bootstrapping, resampling at the subject level.
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subject-level random effects. These estimates, reported in Table 2, are very similar to
the overall skewness estimates. Therefore, I arrive at the following conclusion.
Result 4. Distributions of bids are left-skewed in private value auctions and right-
skewed in common-value auctions.
Risk aversion and cursed equilibrium predict neither left-skewed nor right-skewed dis-
tributions. Thus, the observed left-skewness in private value auctions is compatible
with type projection, while the observed right-skewness in common value auctions is
not compatible with any theory but “closer” to existing theories. This observation will
be reconsidered below.
Does individual variance decline with experience? In first-price auctions, type pro-
jection equilibria are generally mixed. In contrast, risk aversion and cursedness predict
pure equilibria. Assuming that subjects gaining experience converge to pure equilibria,
the within-subject variance is predicted to be less for experienced subjects than it is for
inexperienced ones. Estimates of the within-subject standard deviations are obtained in
regression analyses corresponding with those for individual skewness, and presented in
Table 3 in the columns entitled “Standard Deviation within Ss”. Their interaction with
experience is estimated in regression models with different within-subject variances
for the two levels of experience. Table 4 presents the results in the columns on the
“Within-Subject Variance”. I test the hypothesis in multiple ways, either holding the
conditions such as number of players N or signal bandwidth w constant, or pooling the
data and then controlling for N or w.19 Summarizing, the overall results strongly indi-
cate that the within-subject variance does not decline as subjects gain experience. This
holds both in treatment-wise comparisons when they are possible, noting that treatment
parameters in some experiments are changed as subjects gain experience (see Table 2),
and after pooling treatments. Between the 13 tests in Table 3, there is one significant
result for either direction, but none of them is significant at the .005 level, as would be
required by the Bonferroni correction. These observations are summarized as follows.
Result 5. The within-subject variance does not differ between experienced and inex-
perienced subjects. There is no indication that subjects converge to a pure strategy as
they gain experience, and even experienced subjects seem to randomize consistently.
This confirms the prediction of type projection equilibrium.
19The supplementary material contains related evidence on the treatment effects with respect to the
degree of overbidding and the within-subject variance (holding experience constant). Here, I focus on
the tests of the hypotheses developed above.
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Table 3: Statistical tests of the degree of overbidding and within-subject variance (with
respect to the degree of overbidding) as a function of experience
Degree of Overbidding Within-Subject Variance Between-Subj
Data Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Variance
Independent private values auctions (DKL89, KL93)
N = 3 0.104 ≈ 0.148 0.16 ≈ 0.123 0.033
N = 5 0.08 > −0.144 0.142 < 0.36 0.077
N = 6 −0.021 < 0.036 0.164 ≈ 0.11 0.039
all N 0.05 ≈ 0.04 0.156 ≈ 0.178 0.119
all, contr. for N 0.05 ≈ 0.041 0.155 ≈ 0.179 0.103
Affiliated private values auctions (KHL87)
w = 12 0.104 ≈ 0.062 0.051 ≈ 0.172 0.17
All data −0.058  0.142 0.331 > 0.15 0.134
All, contr. for w 0.058 ≈ 0.04 0.192 ≈ 0.209 0.117
Common value auctions (KL86)
N ≤ 4, w ∈ {12,18} 0.538 > 0.228 0.415 ≈ 0.343 0.208
N ≤ 4, all w 0.63  0.316 0.37 ≈ 0.363 0.233
N ≥ 5, all w 0.613  0.389 0.344 ≈ 0.309 0.254
all N, w ∈ {12,18} 0.517 ≈ 0.404 0.397 ≈ 0.332 0.263
all N, all w 0.621  0.359 0.357 ≈ 0.332 0.242
all N, all w, contr. for w 0.573 ≈ 0.411 0.349 ≈ 0.337 0.247
Description: The table reports the results of one set of statistical tests per row. Given the subset of data specified in
column 1, two null hypotheses are simultaneously tested: (i) H0 : the degree of overbidding does not differ between
inexperienced and experienced subjects, and (ii) H0 : the residual (i.e. within-subject) variances do not differ between
them. These nulls are tested in regression models with the degree of overbidding as independent variable and the level of
experience as independent variable (without intercept)., indicate rejection of H0 at the .005 level and >,< indicate
rejection at .05, where the p-values are bootstrapped as described above. Considering the Bonferroni correction for the
multiple testing problem inherent in this analysis, results should be significant roughly at the .005 level. Terms such as
the degree of overbidding are used as defined above (e.g. Table 2).
Table 4: Statistical tests of differences in the degree of overbidding and within-subject
variance between auctions with affiliated private values and common values
Degree of Overbidding Within-Subject Variance Between-Subj
Data APV CV APV CV Variance
Inexperienced, w = 6 −0.128  0.641 0.359 ≈ 0.341 0.246
Inexperienced, w = 12 0.104  0.523 0.052  0.4 0.147
Inexperienced, all w −0.058  0.621 0.326 ≈ 0.361 0.21
Experienced, w≤ 18 0.062  0.403 0.159 < 0.336 0.248
Experienced, w≥ 24 0.179 < 0.329 0.113  0.32 0.13
Experienced, all w 0.142  0.357 0.15  0.343 0.162
Description: The sole difference to Table 3 is that the comparison is between APV and CV auctions, instead of
inexperienced and experienced subjects.
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Is the degree of overbidding larger in CV than in PV auctions? In auctions with
common values, projection induces both loser regret and cursed value perception, and
in this sense, projecting players have stronger incentives to overbid (in relation to BNE)
in common value auctions than in private value auctions. This hypothesis can be tested
by comparing bidding in KL86’s CV auctions and with bidding in KHL87’s APV auc-
tions. These experiments implement common values and (affiliated) private values in
otherwise equivalent conditions: signal bandwidths w are similar, numbers of players
N are similar, and even experimental instructions and logistics are similar. This hy-
pothesis is evaluated using an econometric approach similar to the one used to compare
experienced and inexperienced bidders, i.e. by regressing the degree of overbidding on
the information condition (APV or CV), controlling for subject-level random effects
and bootstrapping p-values. The degree of overbidding is the difference between nor-
malized bid and BNE bid. Table 4 presents the results: Across all treatment conditions
and experience levels, the degree of overbidding is highly significantly higher in CV
auctions than in APV auctions.20
Result 6. The degree of overbidding is higher in CV auctions than in APV auctions.
6 Quantifying the empirical content of projection
In this section, I investigate to which degree projection explains the distribution of
bids. First, the descriptive adequacy measures the adequacy after fitting the degree of
projection (ρ) to the data. I look at both, the fit with respect to behavior in particular
information conditions, and the fit with respect to the data pooled across conditions.
We may expect that projection fits well in any given condition, due to the qualitative
properties discussed above, but the fit of projection with respect to the pooled data is
less obvious. Projection fits to pooled data only if a specific degree of projection ap-
plies to all information conditions. This cannot be guaranteed or denied on a qualitative
case-by-case basis.
Second, the predictive adequacy measures the adequacy after fitting the degree of pro-
20The supplementary material contains further robustness checks by testing a variety of alternative
measures of the degree of overbidding derived from differences of realized and hypothetical payoffs.
Without overbidding, those differences would be zero, while they are non-zero if subjects overbid.
These tests have substantially less power, as both realized and hypothetical payoffs are zero for most
subjects in any given auction. Their results still indicate highly significant more overbidding in CV
auctions if subjects are inexperienced, though differences are not quite significant for experienced ones
(presumably due to the lack of power, as all differences point into the predicted direction).
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jection to one information condition and using the estimate to predict the remaining
data. This allows me to determine the robustness of the fit.21 Clearly, a high de-
scriptive adequacy does not guarantee predictive adequacy if the model overfits. In
particular, even if a specific degree of projection allows us to explain behavior after
pooling across information conditions, we cannot rule out that an entirely different
degree of projection would have provided a better fit in a particular condition while
ruining predictions in alternative conditions. Ideally, projection is both, descriptively
and predictively adequate, but this requires robustness of the degree of projection.
Third, inferential adequacy measures the adequacy of projection (out of sample, again)
to infer the bidders’ valuations from their bids. Besides measuring the goodness of fit
in an inverted way, this measure may be of explicit interest for practitioners.22
In addition, it may be interesting to know to which degree projection works across
conditions. To this end, the empirical content of projection is quantified by the Cox-
Snell pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke, 1991) in addition the above measures, and I relate the
goodness-of-fit of projection to that of existing explanations of auction behavior (risk
aversion, cursedness, and belief asymmetry). I find that projection describes behavior
more adequately than existing concepts in all dimensions, and even combined they do
not fit better than projection. Projection seems to explain all we currently can explain.
The econometric methodology is standard. I consider a structural model of bidding that
allows for individual errors, belief asymmetry, and individual heterogeneity. The errors
follow from logistic utility perturbations. The basic model underlying the analysis is
the quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In the context of type
projection in Bayesian games, it can be defined as follows.
Definition 4. For any λ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ [0,1), a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is a
(λ,ρ)-type projection logit equilibrium ((λ,ρ)-TPLE) if for all players i ∈ N, all types
ti ∈ Ti, and all actions ai ∈ Ai,
σi(ai|ti) =
exp{λ pii
(
ai|ti, σ˜−i
)}
∑a′i∈Ai exp{λ pii
(
a′i|ti, σ˜−i
)}
21The tendency to distinguish descriptive and predictive adequacy is a rather recent development
in analyses of decision-theoretic models (Wilcox, 2008; Hey et al., 2010), learning models (Erev and
Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Tang, 2003; Ho et al., 2008), and simple games (Blanco et al., 2011;
Shapiro et al., 2014). I am not aware of existing analyses in Bayesian games in general or auctions in
particular. The approach adopted here is known as cross-validation (Browne, 2000) with nonrandom
holdout samples (Keane and Wolpin, 2007).
22This approach towards model validation follows Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), who also discuss
further applications.
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Figure 5: Logit equilibria with varying precisions λ predict almost invariant modes and
provide no systematic explanation of overbidding
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(b) Affiliated private values
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(c) Common values
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with σ˜−i(a−i|t−i) = ρ∏ j 6=iσ j(a j|ti)+(1−ρ)∏ j 6=iσ j(a j|t j).
For simplicity, I abbreviate (λ,ρ)-TPLE as QRE. First, it constitutes the standard
model in behavioral game theory,23 and as such, its choice does not exploit a degree of
freedom. Secondly, QRE captures errors and by being structural, it allows me to esti-
mate parameters such as the degree of projection. Thirdly, QRE is a fairly neutral base
model in auctions. Changes in the precision λ do not affect the degree of overbidding,
as Figure 5 shows. Finally, by pooling various data sets and by restricting QRE to a
single degree of freedom (λ), I avoid the potential critique that QRE with sufficient
freedom in the correlation structure allows me to fit any single data set.24
Non-equilibrium models may be plausible bases in alternative classes of games, but
they are not invariant with respect to the degree of overbidding. Non-equilibrium mod-
els partially explain overbidding and thus constitute alternative explanations rather than
base models in their own rights. Amongst all alternatives, the main candidate that
stands out shall be dubbed asymmetric quantal response equilibrium (AQRE). AQRE
allows that players believe their opponents play a QRE with precision λ ≥ 0 and in
response to this belief, they play a strategy with precision κ ≥ 0.25 AQRE contains
the most important models discussed in the literature as special cases. Besides QRE,
23QRE with logistic errors explains behavior in games as diverse as the centipede game (Fey et al.,
1996), the traveler’s dilemma (Capra et al., 1999), public goods games (Goeree et al., 2002a), monotone
contribution games (Choi et al., 2008), and beauty contests (Breitmoser, 2012).
24Haile et al. (2006) show that QRE with fully flexible correlation of perturbations allows to fit any
single set of choice probabilities. By using multiple choices per subject, pooling multiple treatments,
and assuming independence of irrelevant alternatives, this flexibility is ruled out here.
25AQRE differs from the asymmetric logit equilibrium defined by Weizsäcker (2003) insofar as op-
ponents do not know that I use some κ 6= λ. They simply play the QRE with precision λ.
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which is contained for λ= κ, it contains level-1 behavior for λ= 0 and logit responses
to BNE for λ→ ∞. The level-1 case has been discussed by Crawford and Iriberri
(2007) and noisy responses to BNE are the standard assumption in structural analyses
of auctions, see e.g. Bajari and Hortacsu (2005). Thus, by using AQRE as control,
these standard models are implicitly contained as special cases and thus also included
in the analysis.26 The detailed results are in the supplement. I find that these models
of belief asymmetry do not explain auction behavior robustly better than QRE.
6.1 Descriptive adequacy in standard auctions
Throughout the analysis, I allow for heterogeneity of subjects. Consistent with the
lack of time trends found above, each subject behaves according to a constant set of
parameters, but the parameters are randomly distributed across subjects. The precision
parameters λ and κ are bounded at zero and have independent gamma distributions,
whereas the degrees of risk aversion, projection and cursedness are bounded at both
0 and 1 and have independent beta distributions. Thus, each subject is described by a
parameter vector p ∈ P with joint density f (). Using os = (os,t) to describe the obser-
vations of subject s ∈ S at time t ∈ T , and σ(os,t | f ) as the probability of observation
os,t under density f , the individual likelihood given the observations os of subject s is
ls( f |os) =
∫
P
∏
t∈T
σ(os,t |p) · f (p)dp.
The predictions σ(os,t | f ) implicitly depend also on the underlying belief model, e.g.
QRE or AQRE. The integral is evaluated by simulation, using quasi random numbers,
see Train (2003) and e.g. the supplement to Bellemare et al. (2008). Aggregating across
subjects, the log-likelihood of the respective belief model with parameter density f is
ll( f ) =∑
s∈S
log ls( f |os).
Parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood,27 and the estimates are
tested by extensive cross-analysis to ensure that global maxima are found. All param-
eter estimates and likelihood-ratio tests are provided as supplementary material.
26To be conservative, I additionally estimate level-k (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel, 1995), cognitive
hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004)1 and noisy introspection models (Goeree and Holt, 2004).
27I sequentially applying two maximization algorithms. Initially, I use the robust, gradient-free
NEWUOA algorithm (Powell, 2006) and I verify convergence using a Newton-Raphson algorithm.
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Table 5: The models’ adequacy to capture behavior in “standard auctions” – As for all measures: Less is better
Plain models (assuming homogeneous parameters) Mixture models (assuming heterogeneous parameters)
RiskAv P&RA C&RA Proj Curse Mix Log Mix RA Mix C&RA Mix P&RA Mix Proj Mix Curse
Descriptive Adequacy (Bayes Information Criterion)
Inexperienced subjects
CV1 1349  1322 ≈ 1318 ≈ 1320 ≈ 1316 1347  1351  1312 < 1322 ≈ 1321 > 1308
CV2 746 ≈ 735 ≈ 737 ≈ 734 ≈ 736 744  747 > 726 ≈ 731 ≈ 729 ≈ 726
APV 883 ≈ 883 ≈ 886 ≈ 881 ≈ 885 964  864 ≈ 864 ≈ 863 ≈ 871 ≈ 878
IPV 918  871  919  870  1089 1076  911 ≈ 912  859 ≈ 853  1072
Pooled 3998  3898  3956  3893  4152 4149  3924  3796 ≈ 3780 ≈ 3771  3962
Experienced subjects
CV1 1478 > 1447 ≈ 1442 ≈ 1464 ≈ 1440 1468 ≈ 1465  1405  1428 > 1422  1403
APV 965 ≈ 965 ≈ 967 < 991  1101 1293  957 < 961 ≈ 960 ≈ 961  1111
IPV 1136  1047  1139  1042  1349 1327  1106 ≈ 1106  1027 ≈ 1034  1327
Pooled 3718  3496  3611 ≈ 3570  4029 4086  3603  3418 > 3377 ≈ 3406  3833
Predictive Adequacy (Absolute Value of Log-Likelihood)
Inexp Ss 4499  4088  4560  4075  5943 4288  4604  4123  4299  4123 ≈ 4082
Exp Ss 4043  3870  3978 ≈ 4029  4268 4116  3873  3686 ≈ 3633 ≈ 3599  4399
Inferential Adequacy (Mean Absolute Deviation)
Inexp Ss 2481  2109  2224  2108  2334 2414 ≈ 2442  2358 > 2319  2121 ≈ 2065
Exp Ss 4248  3042  3414  4611 ≈ 4453 4655  3962  3259 ≈ 3184 ≈ 3508 < 3728
Note: The relation signs describe the results of Vuong tests of the likelihood ratios (nested or non-nested as appropriate, with bootstrapped p-values, using individual subjects as
independent observations). In all cases, the less the score the better.  indicates that the left model outperforms the right one at p < .005, < indicates .005 < p < .05,  and >
indicate corresponding inference in favor of the right model, and ≈ indicates insignificance of the difference.
Notation: “RA” stands for constant relative risk aversion, “P” for projection, and “C” for cursed equilibrium. “&” indicates models merging these approaches.
Table 6: Pseudo-R2 of the various models (Higher is better)
Inexperienced Subjects Experienced Subjects
Curse RA Proj Mix Logit Mix RA Mix Proj Mix Curse Curse RA Proj Mix Logit Mix RA Mix Proj Mix Curse
Descriptive Adequacy (In-Sample BIC)
Standard Pooled 0.33  0.48 ≈ 0.48 > 0.48  0.61  0.69  0.61 0.46 ≈ 0.46  0.74  0.36  0.79  0.84  0.61
Non-Stand CV 0.22 > 0.1  0.32  0.1 ≈ 0.1  0.35 ≈ 0.27 0.24  0.1 < 0.23 ≈ 0.19 ≈ 0.22 ≈ 0.32 ≈ 0.32
Discrete IPV 0.16  0.62 ≈ 0.65  0.17  0.73 ≈ 0.72  0.15 0.14  0.58 ≈ 0.64  0.17  0.72 ≈ 0.73  0.18
Predictive Adequacy (Out-Of-Sample |LL|)
Standard Pooled 0.12  0.54  0.77  0.66  0.36  0.75 < 0.79 0.57 ≈ 0.53  0.76  0.54  0.77  0.86  0.41
Non-Stand CV 0.45  0.21  0.4 > 0.32  0.35 < 0.42  0.53 0.45  0.21  0.4 > 0.32  0.35 < 0.42  0.53
Discrete IPV 0.37 ≈ 0.4  0.59  0.38  0.59  0.71  0.44 0.37 ≈ 0.4  0.59  0.38  0.59  0.71  0.44
Note: The testing procedure is equivalent (i.e. p-values are bootstrap using subjects’ scores as independent observations), the difference being that pseudo-R2 are used.
The main results of the analysis are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 and in Figures
6–8. I focus on the fit using QRE with heterogeneity of subjects, but as shown in the
supplementary material, the results are very similar for all non-equilibrium models and
with homogeneous parameters. For convenience, Tables 5 and 6 also provide the main
results on the adequacy measures for homogenous parameters.
As for inexperienced subjects, Table 5 provides the results for first- and second-price
common value auctions, and for two kinds of private values auctions (affiliated and
independent ones), as described in the overview of the data. Regarding these informa-
tion conditions in isolation, the main hypotheses are confirmed. In CV auctions, where
both cursedness and projection predict overbidding, these concepts fit about similarly
well. In PV auctions, both risk aversion and projection predict overbidding, and these
concepts fit about similarly well. In common value auctions, the left-skewness pre-
dicted by projection is not observed, and cursedness fits slightly better than projection.
In turn, left-skewness predicted by projection is observed in private value auctions, and
there, projections fits slightly better than risk aversion. In aggregate, projection is the
only concept that is compatible with overbidding across information conditions, and it
fits the pooled set of observations highly significantly better than the other concepts in
isolation. The picture is very similar for experienced subjects.
Intuitively, a model combining both cursedness and risk aversion attains a better fit
overall than these concepts in isolation, and indeed, this combined model has a descrip-
tive adequacy that is statistically not different from that of projection. In turn, projec-
tion explains everything that these concepts explain in combination. Also, enriching
projection by risk aversion does not significantly improve its descriptive adequacy, but
the resulting adequacy is significantly higher than that of the model combining cursed-
ness and risk aversion (if subjects are experienced). In order to quantify the amount of
variance explained by the models, Table 6 provides the respective pseudo-R2 for the
pooled samples.28
Result 7 (Descriptive adequacy). The descriptive adequacy of projection is about as
high as the best of risk aversion and cursedness in each information condition. Overall,
projection fits significantly better than these concepts in isolation, it fits about as well
as the approaches combined, and it explains around 65% of the observed variance.
28The pseudo-R2 measures how much a given model explains in relation to a baseline model. Let l1,s
denote the likelihood of the model in question with respect to subject s, and let l0,s denote the baseline
likelihood with respect to the subject in question (= the minimum of all likelihoods that the range of
models estimated here yield). The Cox-Snell pseudo-R2 of subject s is r2s = 1− (l0,s/l1,s)2/Ns where Ns
is the number of observations. The mean of the individual pseudo-R2 over the entire sample is used in
comparisons. Testing the differences between two pseudo-R2 follows the procedure for Vuong tests.
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Figures 6–8 plot the predicted densities of the models over the histograms. As dis-
cussed above, risk aversion predicts the wrong mode in the common value auctions
(for all α, it predicts that BNE bids, r = −1 in these cases, have the highest probabil-
ity), and cursedness predicts the wrong mode in private value auctions (in particular
in IPV auctions). Projection has no such weakness and fits better than these concepts
overall. The data on CV auctions are particularly interesting, as it shows that subjects
are rather unlikely to bid below the BNE bid of r = −1. That is, subjects hardly bid
less than an interval width w below their signal. As a result, the observations look
like they are censored at r =−1, in particular for inexperienced subjects. Bidding less
than r = −1 implies that all signals were certainly higher than the own bid, and for
subjects, bid shading to such an extent seems to be difficult—although they should do
so, based on expected payoffs. Bidding below r =−1 is associated with non-negative
expected payoffs for all beliefs, whereas outbidding the own signal (i.e. bidding r > 0)
is associated with non-positive payoffs for all beliefs (assuming symmetric strategies).
As a result of this apparent self-censoring, observed bids do not exhibit the predicted
tail to the left in the data on CV auctions, but as all concepts fail to predict such self-
censoring, the resulting descriptive adequacies do not differ substantially.
6.2 Predictive adequacy in standard auctions
Having estimated the model parameters for all data sets, I look at their adequacy to
actually predict behavior. The observed adequacy of projection to ex-post explain
behavior does not imply that it is predictive. Predictive adequacy requires the degree
of projection to be robust across data sets not just in the ex-post sense, but also in an
ex-ante sense: a chosen degree of projection needs to explain behavior before fitting
ρ to the data. I test the even stronger assertion that ρ needs to explain behavior after
fitting it to the wrong data. Thus, measures of descriptive and predictive adequacy may
be seen as necessary and sufficient measures of the general model adequacy.
All parameters are estimated on “training data” and used to evaluate the model’s log-
likelihood on the entire data set (for the respective level of experience). For each
model, this yields a total of seven basic measures, derived from each of the four train-
ing data sets for inexperienced subjects and each of the three training data sets for
experienced ones. These basic measures still contain the goodness-of-fit with respect
to the training data, alongside the remaining data, and thus they are partially in-sample.
In order to evaluate the predictive adequacy fully out-of-sample, I next remove the in-
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Figure 6: The predictions of mixed QRE with risk aversion in relation to histograms of the data
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Figure 7: The predictions of mixed QRE with projection in relation to histograms of the data
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Figure 8: The predictions of mixed QRE with cursedness in relation to histograms of the data
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Note: In all cases, the histogram is the distribution of normalized bids in the respective information condition, and the line plotted above it is the density of the
prediction of the respective concept aggregated across treatments in the respective information condition.
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sample segments of the data sets, aggregate the remaining out-of-sample LLs over all
training data sets given the respective level of experience, and divide by the number of
times that each data set was used in the out-of-sample evaluation stage.29 This mea-
sure is called “pooled out-of-sample LL”, and I report the absolute values. It is purely
out-of-sample and its magnitude is comparable to that of the in-sample BIC.
By the qualitative properties, I hypothesize that projection yields higher predictive ad-
equacy than the other concepts in isolation, as projection predicts overbidding across
information conditions. Further, if subjects are inexperienced, risk aversion is pre-
dicted to predict worse than for cursedness (then, cursedness has descriptive adequacy
in three out of four conditions, see above),30 but if subjects are experienced, the cir-
cumstances seem to favor risk aversion (which fits in two out of the three conditions
then). The respective section of Table 5 shows that these relations are significant in
the data. That is, risk aversion predicts well for experienced subjects but less so for
inexperienced ones, and cursedness predicts well for inexperienced subjects but not
for experienced ones. Surprisingly, in the cases where these concepts do not predict
well, they actually predict poorly in an absolute sense—their predictive adequacies fall
below that of mixed logit equilibrium, and thus their structural explanations actually
have negative validity for the respective levels of experience. In turn, the predictive
adequacy of projection is significantly higher than each of these if subjects are experi-
enced, it is about as high as that of cursedness if subjects are inexperienced, it improves
on mixed logit in all cases, it is as high as that of the model combining cursedness and
risk aversion if subjects are inexperienced, and projection predicts best if subjects are
experienced.
Result 8 (Predictive adequacy). For both inexperienced and experienced subjects, pro-
jection equilibrium belongs to the most predictive models in all cases, it predicts better
than each model in at least one case, and it always improves on mixed logit. Extending
projection by risk aversion does not improve its predictive adequacy.
29Each of the four data sets for inexperienced subjects is used thrice in the out-of-sample evaluation,
and each of the three data sets for experienced subjects is used twice. This measure is leaned on cross-
validation (Browne, 2000) with nonrandom holdout samples (Keane and Wolpin, 2007).
30In addition to the common value auctions, cursedness fits as well as projection in the affiliated
private value auctions of inexperienced subjects, where behavior is rather noisy and exhibits little over-
bidding.
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6.3 Inferential adequacy in standard auctions
The inferential adequacy is similar to the predictive adequacy in that it is purely out-of-
sample, but instead of determining log-likelihoods, we infer subject values in a proce-
dure following Bajari and Hortacsu (2005). Given an observation and a set of parame-
ters (estimated using training data), the theoretical bidding function for the respective
out-of-sample treatment is determined and the expectation of the signal conditional on
the observed bid is computed. This conditional expectation is called inferred signal.
The inferential adequacy is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) to the actual signal.
The supplementary material additionally also lists the results for the mean squared de-
viation (MSD), which are very similar. The inferential adequacy is complementary to
the predictive adequacy due to its focus on the expectation of the underlying signal.
That is, the first moment of its distribution needs to be predicted, rather than the full
distribution. In turn, the likelihood allows one to substitute getting the moment right
for getting the distribution right. Testing a concept’s adequacy in predicting both first
moment and full distribution therefore is challenging, but by its qualitative properties,
I hypothesize projection to be adequate also in this dimension.
The results are presented in the third panel of Table 5. They are qualitatively similar
to those for the predictive adequacy, which shows that projection adequately predicts
both the first moment and the distribution, as predicted. The main differences to the
previous observations can be observed for risk aversion and cursedness. Risk aversion
fits rather poorly when focusing on the first moment, while cursedness fits rather well.
In particular, risk aversion fits worse than projection now for both levels of experience,
and also worse than cursedness, which in turn significantly improves on mixed logit
for both levels (though not on projection).
Result 9 (Inferential adequacy). For both levels of experience, projection is one of the
models exhibiting the highest inferential adequacy, and it improves on all alternative
models for at least one of the levels of experience.
6.4 Adequacy in non-standard auctions
I finally test the fit to behavior in the “non-standard” auctions with private values (Go-
eree et al., 2002b, GHP02) and common values (Avery and Kagel, 1997, AK97).31 The
31The first-price IPV auctions of Goeree et al. (2002b) have two players. The values are drawn from
{0,2,4,6,8,11} or {0,3,5,7,9,12}. The former case is called “Low Signals” treatment, the latter is
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Table 7: The models’ adequacy to capture behavior in “non-standard auctions” (less is
better)
Mix Log Mix RA Mix C&RA Mix P&RA Mix Proj Mix Curse
Descriptive Adequacy (Bayes Information Criterion)
Inexperienced subjects
AK97 553  556 > 546 > 537  534 < 542
GHP02 694  423  431  425 < 439  700
Experienced subjects
AK97 524 ≈ 525 ≈ 519 ≈ 519  515 ≈ 517
GHP02 631  359  362 > 358 > 349  627
Predictive Adequacy (Non-standard→ Standard; absolute value of log-likelihood)
Inexperienced subjects
AK97 4269 > 4256  4126 > 4027  4040 ≈ 4080
GHP02 4252  3981  3834  3973  3842  4157
Experienced subjects
AK97 4214  3836  3602 ≈ 3574  3647  3888
GHP02 4261  3750  3595  3502 ≈ 3474  3984
analysis of the discrete GHP02 auction is interesting, as projection partially predicts
overbidding because of the assumption that outbidding opponents with similar values
is possible at low costs in standard auctions. In the simple model of projection consid-
ered here, any increment of ε > 0 suffices if bids are continuous. If bids are discrete,
opponents bidding 2 monetary units, such as those with signals 4 or 5 in GHP02, need
to be outbid by 50% to break the tie. If the signal is just 4, breaking the tie reduces
the expected profits from 2 units (bidding 2 with signal 4) to 1 unit (bidding 3). Since
this is just a two-player auction, the player is indifferent in this case. In equilibrium,
projecting players still overbid with positive probability, even with ρ-projection and
ρ < 1. In general, though, overbidding is predicted to be more limited than in stan-
dard auctions, and more pronounced for players with high values. Qualitatively, this
matches the observations of GHP02.
The common value auction of AK97 is non-standard in the sense that the common
value is simply the sum of (two) independent signals. The BNE prediction is to bid
twice the own signal, which is the expectation of the common value in case one is just
able to win the auction (i.e. if both signals are equal). A fully projecting player always
assumes the opponent’s signal is equal to the own signal. The expected object value
in this case is equal to the own signal (xi) plus the average opponent’s actual signal
(2.5), yielding the conditional expectation xi + 2.5. This equates with the conditional
expectation of a fully cursed player. More generally, a χ-cursed player has expecta-
tion χ(xi + 2.5) + (1− χ)(2xi), which he also bids in AK97’s second price auction
called “High Signals” treatment. The unique BNE equilibrium bids are {0,1,2,3,4,5} in either case.
Avery and Kagel (1997) implemented second-price common-value auctions of two players. The players
draw independent signals Xi ∼ U [1,4] and the common value common value is v = X1 +X2 (in their
“symmetric case”, on which I focus). The BNE strategy is b(xi) = 2xi.
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(Crawford and Iriberri, 2007, provide further details). A ρ-projecting player has the
corresponding expectation x∗ = ρ(xi + 2.5)+ (1−ρ)(2xi) conditional on winning all
ties, but bidding this value is winning only with probability of ρ/2 in the projection
case (if the opponent bids x∗, too). Conditional on this, the projected expectation is
(ρ/2)(xi + 2.5) + (1− ρ/2)(2xi), i.e. higher than x∗ if xi > 2.5. This generates an
incentive to outbid the opponent—but outbidding x∗ throws him back to winning all
ties and thus to the conditional expectation x∗. In equilibrium, the projecting player
uses a mixed strategy with support between the cursed equilibrium (xi + 2.5) and the
BNE (2xi). Thus, a projecting player underbids the BNE if xi > 2.5, and similarly, he
outbids the BNE if xi < 2.5. Overall, this pattern matches AK97’s observations.
Table 7 presents the quantitative adequacies to explain these observations. I focus on
descriptive and predictive adequacy, of which the latter concerns the adequacy of the
estimates taken from these non-standard auctions in predicting the pooled standard
auctions. This appears to be the main direction of interest and the predictive adequacy
in the other direction (from standard toward non-standard) is largely insignificant due
to the smaller sizes of the non-standard data sets. Information about the fit in this
second direction and the inferential adequacy is provided as supplementary material.
Result 10 (Non-standard auctions). Projection fits about as well as risk aversion in
the non-standard private value auction, about as well as cursed equilibrium in the
non-standard common-value auction, and in all cases, about as well as these concepts
combined. It predicts better than each of these models in at least one of the cases.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper is to model and test projection of types in Bayesian games.
It is well-established in psychological research that people project their preferences
and beliefs onto others in cases of incomplete information, and thus, we may plausibly
expect that projection affects behavior also in games. First, I define type projection
equilibrium, leaving the choice of the degree of projection to the analyst, and show that
a projection equilibrium exists for all degrees ρ ∈ [0,1). Second, its predictions were
tested mainly on a class of Bayesian games, auctions, where projection was perhaps
least expected to affect behavior—despite the large amounts of studies dedicated to
either, auctions in economics and projection in psychology. To my knowledge, the
only paper mentioning a potential link between bidding and projection is Engelmann
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and Strobel (2012).
I studied the properties of projection equilibrium in auctions, tested the testable impli-
cations, and analyzed the overall fit to the data. Projection equilibria tend to be mixed
and left-skewed, and in each information condition, projection fits about as well as
the best existing explanation—risk aversion and cursed equilibrium, for private and
common values, respectively. These existing explanations of overbidding are orthogo-
nal, however, i.e. depending on information condition a different explanation is being
called upon. Projection, in turn, offers a unified explanation based on a psychologically
well-founded concept, and as an advantage, it offers an explanation that is overall more
descriptive and robust. Thus, we may conclude that projection of values affects behav-
ior in auctions and that analyses of bidding seem to benefit from considering projection
as a potential explanation. This corroborates independent findings that negotiating sub-
jects project their willingness-to-pay and their reservation prices onto their opponents,
and was further validated by showing that projection of preferences helps explain the
within-subject variance of behavior in simple distribution games.
This suggests that type projection is relevant in all games with incomplete informa-
tion—assuming the player types are symmetric ex ante. This symmetry assumption
was made partially for simplicity, but it also reflects the range of interactions where
psychologists studied projection and false consensus effects. In interactions of dis-
tinctively asymmetric players, e.g. buyers and sellers, or informed and uninformed
players, the alternative concepts of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) and
information projection (Madarász, 2012) appear to be more intuitive starting points.
From a more general perspective, three points may be worth noting. First, projection
affects behavior in games, but subjects tend not to fully project their types. While this
may not be surprising to psychologists, who studied projection in decision-theoretic
frameworks, the comprehensive analysis of projection in an important class of games is
novel, and the empirical content of projection is surprisingly high. Further, experimen-
tal work in economics tends to attribute most of the deviations from Nash equilibrium
to either preferences, such as risk aversion or inequity aversion, or belief asymmetry,
such as level-k. Needless to say, each of these intuitions impacts behavior in general,
but projection should not be neglected as a confound simply because the literature
focused on other issues so far. Second, practitioners of auction theory may consider
projection at least alongside risk aversion as an explanation of overbidding. This has
both a downside and an upside. On the downside, projection equilibria are mixed and
their computation may require information that analysts do not immediately have, e.g.
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the upper bound of values in private value auctions. Less information is required if one
is willing to assume Bayesian Nash equilibrium and thus to neglect projection (for a
review, see Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005). This assumption is highly debatable, though,
as Crawford and Iriberri (2007) challenge the equilibrium assumption and my results
challenge the neglect of projection. Further on the upside, projection equilibria fit
more robustly than BNE with risk aversion across information conditions, which sug-
gests that they are less prone to misspecification of the information conditions and the
value parameters. It is unclear which of these effects dominates in which conditions,
but it is probably not always the first one.
Finally, Engelmann and Strobel (2012) have shown that subjects are less likely to
project if they are provided with the objective information in the best possible way.
This suggests that the fallacy to projection may be subject to policy intervention, even
if the best way of providing information is not obvious in all cases. Further, to the
degree that overbidding is due to risk aversion, information does not help efficiency.
To the degree that overbidding is due to projection, educating subjects increases the ef-
ficiency in at least two ways: Subjects stop randomizing in equilibrium, which ensures
that the bidder with the highest value wins, and in cases where not just the winners
pay their bids (e.g. contests), a reduction of overbidding increases efficiency. Thus, the
above findings also have novel policy implications.
A Relegated proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Bayesian game Γ˜=
〈
N,(Ai)i∈N ,T0,(Ti)i∈N , p,ρ,(ui)i∈N
〉
with the follow-
ing move order: (1) With probability 1−ρ, Nature sends all players individual signals
(with joint distribution p), and with probability ρ, Nature sends all of the players the
same signal (drawn from any of the marginal distributions pi, which are equal by type-
symmetry). (2) The players observe their signals and simultaneously choose actions
(ai). The expected payoff of i ∈ N in Γ˜, given action ai, type ti, and opponents’ strate-
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gies σ−i, is
p˜ii
(
ai|ti,σ−i
)
= (1−ρ) ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
p(t−i|ti) ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|t j)
+ρ ∑
a−i∈A−i
ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|ti).
As ti has the same distribution in either case and ∑t−i p(t−i|ti) = 1, we obtain
p˜ii
(
ai|ti,σ−i
)
= (1−ρ) ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
p(t−i|ti) ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|t j)
+ρ ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
p(t−i|ti) ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
∏
j 6=i
σ j(a j|ti)
and thus
p˜ii
(
ai|ti,σ−i
)
= ∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
p(t−i|ti) ui
[
(ai,a−i),(ti, t−i)
]
σ˜−i(a−i|t−i, ti)
using σ˜−i as defined in Eq. (1). Hence, the expected utility of i ∈ N in Γ˜ equals i’s
expected utility under ρ-projection in Γ, and any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ˜ is a
ρ-TPE of Γ. The finiteness of Γ implies finiteness of Γ˜ and thus existence of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ˜, which in turn implies existence of a ρ-TPE of Γ.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Fix any symmetric ρ-TPE. It has already been established that σ must be mixed and
have increasing density on its support. It remains to characterize its bounds. First,
consider the lower bound r of the support. The directional derivative with respect to
dr < 0
Π˜′ρ(r|σ)
∣∣
r=r,dr<0 = (1−ρ)Π˜′(r|σ)
must be non-negative. Otherwise, one benefits through deviating by putting probability
mass on bids r < r. Thus, Π˜′(r|σ)≥ 0. Second,
Π˜′ρ(r|σ)
∣∣
r=r,dr>0 = ρ(V˜ − r)σ(r)+(1−ρ)Π˜′(r|σ)
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must be zero, since σ is mixed. Further, V˜ − r > 0; otherwise the assumption that
v˜ is increasing would imply Π˜ρ(r|σ) < 0, contradicting the assumption that σ is an
equilibrium. Hence, Π˜′(r|σ) = 0 and σ(r) = 0.
Second, I show that this implies r ≥ rBNE . Let BR : ∆R → P (R) denote the best-
response correspondence (allowing for mixed strategies as arguments) of the auction
without projection. For simplicity, let BR(r′) also denote the best response to the pure
strategy r′. Define r := BR(r). Strategic complementarity implies dΠ˜(r|r′)/dr > 0
for all r′ > r. Hence, dΠ˜(r|σ)/dr > 0 and infBR(σ) > BR(r). Since we know r =
infBR(σ), we obtain r > BR(r), and by strategic complementarity r > rBNE .
Third, I characterize the upper bound r. To begin with, r ≥ rBNE implies r ≥ rBNE ,
and the fact that it is a best response to σ implies that it yields non-negative expected
payoffs. That is
Π˜ρ(r|σ) = (1−ρ)Π˜(r|σ)+ρ(V˜ − r)Fσ(r)≥ 0.
Since v˜ is non-decreasing, V˜ − r < 0 implies Π˜(r|σ) < 0. Thus, Π˜ρ(r|σ) ≥ 0 implies
V˜ − r ≥ 0 for all ρ≥ 0.
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